

Naval Operating Concept Vignette 3 Response



Assured Access

Element 1: NOC Contributions to JOpsC/MCO

- **Organization of naval forces into numerous tactically stable units (ESG, CSG, ...) enables execution of a wide range of access tasks simultaneously. Squadrons of littoral combat ships, in conjunction with more traditional multi-mission platforms, provide strong capability to overcome the opponent's area denial strategies.**
- **Penetrating and Persistent Sensing enables the collection of high fidelity information which can then be compared to historical data to provide indicators of changes from historical norms - thereby providing insights into future intent. Sea Based sensors grids provide that timely information and targeting for precision weapons .**
- **FORCEnet provides the connectivity and information sharing capability necessary to rapidly fuse new information, access archived information (both locally and via reachback) and distribute information to produce knowledge and facilitate decision making.**
- **JFMCC concept provides the interface between the CJTF/RCC to facilitate operational and strategic decision making based on dynamic events**

Element 1: NOC Contributions to JOpsC/MCO

- **Joint distributed operations are enabled & enhanced by Sea Based Forces providing C2, ForceNet, fires and logistic support.**
- **New generation of amphibious and maritime pre-positioning ships using selective off load in combination with high speed ships and tilt rotor aircraft provide flexible & accelerated employment of capabilities.**

Element 2: Concept of Operations

- **Prep of the Battlespace**
 - **Position Joint/Expeditionary forces including FORCEnet and sensor grids to combat Red's amphibious, airborne assault and missile attack.**
 - **Initially position Sea Base Forces south of Gray to capitalize on defense in depth.**
 - **Detect tag, and track key Red assets including Subs, missile platforms, and amphibious ships**
 - **Set up I&W network including National level ROE for proactive attacks**
 - **Sensors/SOF in-place to detect Missile and WME attacks**

Element 2: Concept of Operations

- **Transition to hostilities**
 - **War at Sea**
 - **Ensure target-quality track of red surface and subsurface forces**
 - **Counter Red attack/conduct power projection ops**
 - **Sea Strike Attack Red offensive forces including missiles & aircraft employing Joint strike forces and SOF.**
 - **BPT conduct Expeditionary operations**
 - **Sea Shield Increase ISR ops to engage Red targets quickly and to attack missile leakers**
 - **Protect Sea Base by deception, maneuver and TAMD assets**
 - **Conduct offensive mining against Red**
 - **Conduct ASW operations using LCS systems, helos, aircraft**
 - **Position for MCM ops vic Gray and Orange using LCS systems**

Element 2: Concept of Operations

- **Ensure Access for Decisive Combat Ops**
 - **Expeditionary Forces employed from the Sea Base for use in Gray or Orange when force at desired strength.**
 - **Use STOM from the dynamic sea base to counter Red anti-access efforts.**
 - ***Use ESGs as mobile strike force against Red anti-access assets (vignette 4)***
 - **Support JFLCC forces operating from Black and Orange to block and counter Red land attack**

Element 3: Derived Capabilities

- **FORCEnet Attributes**

- **Expeditionary Joint & Combined multi-tiered, multi-level security sensor and weapons grids**
 - **Access and leverage national, theater, Service and coalition intelligence through a comprehensive ISR network.**
 - **Tactical sensors need to be stealthy, low cost, and easily deployed.**
- **Distributed, collaborative C2**
- **Dynamic, multi-path and survivable networks**
- **Adaptive/automated decision aids**
- **Human-centric integration**
- **Information Assurance**
- **Capability for detailed maritime IPB**

Element 3: Derived Capabilities

(cont)

- **Seabasing**

- **Enhanced afloat positioning of joint assets**
- **Offensive and defensive power projection**
- **C4ISR**
- **Accelerated deployment and employment timelines**
 - **Phased At Sea Arrival and Assembly**
 - **Selective Offload**
 - **Rapid Force Closure**
 - **Integrated Power Projection**
 - **Reconstitution at Sea**
 - **Persistence and sustainment**

Element 3: Derived Capabilities¹⁰

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- **Sea Strike**
 - **Persistent ISR**
 - **Tactical sensors need to be stealthy, low cost, and easily deployed**
 - **Automated fusion and information management**
 - **Time-sensitive strike**
 - **Electronic warfare/information operations**
 - **STOM**
 - **Strike from covert locations (SSN/SSGN)**
 - **Anti TBM capability including stealthy low cost tags and sensors in red**
 - **HSV (advanced base to Sea Base)**

Element 3: Derived Capabilities¹¹

~~(cont)~~

- **Sea Shield**

- **Persistent ISR**
 - Tagging of high value targets
- **Use of non-lethal weapons at sea to neutralize numerous small craft of uncertain ID**
- **Time-sensitive strike (*against area denial capabilities*)**
- **Electronic warfare/information operations**
- **Projection of the Homeland Defense shield**
 - Hold Red SSBNs at risk
- **Sea / littoral superiority**
 - Tactically stable forces available to overcome opponent's anti-access strategies
- **Theater air missile defense**
 - Highly networked system of sensors and weapons

Questions/Discussion



Element 4

- **Q1) How do we overcome reliance on relatively "fixed" or "templatable" avenues of approach and lines of communication?**
 - **The dynamic Sea Base maneuvers to avoid fixed avenues of approach.**
 - **Ship-to-Objective Maneuver (STOM) capability minimizes need to come ashore at predictable locations, and enables 'lines of communication' to be adjusted rapidly.**
 - **The pervasive sensor grid results in quick detection of threats to lines of communication, allowing relocation away from the threat or destruction of the threat, as desired.**

Element 4

- **Q2) How do we open and maintain access to sea/air lines of communication and the critical littoral areas while supporting distributed operations?**
 - **Expeditionary Pervasive Sensor Grid**
 - **Sea Basing provides increased capability to project and support forces - both Joint and Multinational -from the sea and sustain them using high capacity combat logistic ships.**
 - **Forward presence using Sea Bases mitigates access problems and eases maintenance of LOCs**
 - **Integration of Time Sensitive and Global Strike capability**
 - **Rapid force closure and integrated power projection**

Element 4

- **Q3) How do we establish and maintain access to inland areas beyond the littorals, without access to robust infrastructure, while supporting distributed operations?**
 - **Sea Basing provides increased capability to project and support forces inland from the sea and sustain them using high capacity combat logistic ships. HSV provides in theater movement.**
 - **STOM provides capability to reach objectives inland directly from the Sea Base.**
 - **Integration of Time Sensitive and Global Strike capability**
 - **Sea Shield**
 - **BLOS communications**

Element 4

- **Q4) How do we overcome a robust theater tactical and intercontinental missile threat without use of WMD/WME?**
 - **Sea Shield provides integrated and layered defense and sensor grid that is in theater and able to complement regional capabilities.**
 - **Sea based sensor grid, extended sea shield and Force Net enable proactive and quick attack on missile threat as it is generated and employed.**
 - **Once the need to prosecute these assets has been decided, SOF can play a vital role (direct action).**
 - **Maneuverability of the dynamic Sea Base provides extended operational reach**
 - **Integration of Time Sensitive and Global Strike capability to defeat the tactical and inter-continental missile threat**

Element 5: Recommendations for JOPSC¹⁷/MCO

- **Protection of JFLCC forces enroute and operating from the sea should be explored.**
- **Underscore value of forward presence/sea based forces in region prior to crisis and during crisis**
- **Within the MCO JOC - force projection in an anti-access/area denial environment**
- **The architecture, standards, and C2 arrangements for the joint sensor and weapons grid must be specified**

Questions/Discussion



Mission Statement

On order, RCC will deter Red aggression, and if deterrence fails, RCC will decisively defeat Red's power projection capability within the JOA in order to ensure territorial sovereignty and regional stability.


Commander's Intent (Assured Access)

- **Purpose:** I intend to conduct operations to destroy Red offensive capability existing outside recognized Red territory and capabilities within Red territory that support these external capabilities, restore territorial sovereignty of Gray and Orange, and to ensure regional stability.
- **Method:**
 - Using forward deployed assets, theater assets, pre-positioned forces and CONUS based assets, I will maintain and expand access, and project offensive and defensive combat power across the full range of military operations.
 - Maintain and expand upon a collaborative information environment that enables decentralized and distributed decision making to enable rapid employment of maneuver, fires, and information.
 - If Red conducts first use of nuclear weapons, RCC Blue will immediately neutralize Red's nuclear capability using conventional means.
- **End State:** Red's offensive threat within the region is eliminated, Gray and Orange territorial sovereignty restored, and regional stability restored to enable economic prosperity.

Assumptions

- **DPG Area of Interest**
- **Security Cooperation Plan**
 - **Regional Exercise Plan in effect after 2015**
 - **Gray and Orange allow exercises in country**
- **Increased Info collection element exists**
- **Updated ONA exists for the region**
- **State of war exists between Blue and Red**
- **RCC presently maintaining access in the region**
- **Joint standards established for integrating sensor and weapons grids**

Red Maritime Laydown (D+1)



Red Anti-Access

